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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 















Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(Civ. No. 08-764-SLR) 
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 31, 2013 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 








MCKEE, Chief Judge 
 Staub Design, LLC, John Staub, and David Staub (collectively, “Staub Design” or 




Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 
113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified at § 43(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) 




Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we need 
not recite the procedural or factual background.  
“We exercise plenary review over the District Court's legal conclusions regarding 
the Lanham Act,” but review its factual findings for clear error.  Sabinsa Corp. v. 
Creative Compounds, LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Clear error exists when, 
giving all deference to the opportunity of the trial judge to evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses and to weigh the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.”  Id.  
A. 
 To prevail on his ACPA claim, Carnivale must prove that 1) “The Affordable 
House,” “is a distinctive or famous mark entitled to protection,” 2) Staub Design’s 
domain name is “identical or confusingly similar to” his mark, and 3) Staub Design 
“registered the domain name[] with the bad faith intent to profit from [it].”  Shields v. 
Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001); see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).  We are only 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338, and this 




concerned with the third element: Staub Design’s bad faith intent to profit from 
Carnivale’s mark.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
2
   
The ACPA sets forth nine factors that a court should consider in determining the 
existence of bad faith. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX).  As has been pointed out at 
various stages of this litigation, the factors should be applied in a holistic manner and 
“not [as a] mechanical[] exercise.”  Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Moreover, the ACPA expressly allows courts to “consider any other elements of bad 
faith” not enumerated in the statute.  Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. v. Vogue Int'l, 
123 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799 (D.N.J. 2000); see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (using 
permissive language). 
On remand, we instructed the District Court to reevaluate factor five, the “intent to 
divert consumers,” and factor nine, “the extent to which the mark . . . is or is not 
distinctive and famous.”  Carnivale, 456 F. App'x at 107.  We now review the results of 
that balancing process.  
                                              
2
 In this second appeal, Staub Design also challenges the District Court’s determination 
on the first element, whether Carnivale’s mark is “distinctive.”  Appellants’ Br. 4-21.  
Our opinion on the first appeal explicitly stated that “[w]e do not here disturb the District 
Court’s ruling [on summary judgment] that Carnivale’s mark is distinctive . . . .”  
Carnivale v. Staub Design, LLC, 456 F. App'x 104, 108 n.3 (3d Cir. 2012). Consequently, 
this challenge is foreclosed under “law-of-the-case doctrine” which “bars our 
reconsideration of issues previously resolved by an earlier panel.”  Atl. Coast Demolition 
& Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Atl. Cnty., 112 F.3d 652, 663 (3d Cir. 
1997).  When this Court affirms in part and reverses in part, the issues that we necessarily 
dispose of in the affirmance become “law-of-the-case” despite our remand for additional 
proceedings on separate issues.  Todd & Co., Inc. v. S.E.C., 637 F.2d 154, 156-57 (3d Cir. 
1980); see also Cowgill v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1987).  Staub 
Design does not assert any of the exceptions to the doctrine.  See Pub. Interest Research 





 As to factor five,
3
 although we agreed with the District Court that because “intent 
is rarely discernible directly, it must typically be inferred from pertinent facts and 
circumstances,” Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Int'l 
Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Societe Des Baines De Mer Et Du Cercle Des Etrangers A Monaco, 
192 F. Supp. 2d 467, 486 (E.D. Va. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted), we 
nevertheless directed the District Court to consider whether the record supported an 
inference that the Appellants intended to divert consumers.  Carnivale, 456 F. App’x at 
107.  
 In doing so, the District Court highlighted testimony in which John Staub admitted 
to viewing Carnivale’s website, www.affordablehouse.com.   That website was replete 
with home building-related content, and the District Court pointed to evidence that 
Appellants registered their domain name, www.theaffordablehouse.com, a short time after 
John Staub viewed Carnival’s website.  Carnivale v. Staub Design, LLC, Civ. No. 08–
764–SLR, 2012 WL 6814251, at *2-3 (D. Del. Jan. 7, 2012).  Moreover, the District 
Court refused to credit John Staub’s claim that his website was intended to serve a purely 
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 In full, factor five reads:  
 
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online 
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the 
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the 
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the 
site; 
 




educational function.  Rather, the court ruled to the contrary based on evidence that 
supported a finding of a profit motive.  Id. at *3.  From that evidence, the District Court 
inferred that Staub Design sought to ride the coattails of Carnivale’s long-established 
website—an indicator of bad faith.  Id.   
 On this record, we are not left with a “definite and firm conviction” that Staub 
Design’s intent was unrelated to consumer diversion.  This is especially true when we 
consider that Staub Design’s domain name is the entirety of Carnivale’s mark, “The 
Affordable House.”  See Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 486.  
 As to factor nine,
4
 we directed the District Court to assess the extent to which the 
mark is distinctiveness.  Carnivale, 456 F. App’x at 108.  See § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX); see 
also Shields, 254 F.3d at 482.
5
  Secondary meaning is also relevant to this inquiry.  See 
E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Products, Inc., 538 F.3d 185, 199 (3d Cir. 2008).  On 
remand, the District Court considered these factors and again concluded that “the ninth 
factor slightly supports a finding of bad faith.”  Carnivale, 2012 WL 6814251, at *4. 
Although the District Court’s analysis of factor nine on remand is not without 
some shortcomings, we cannot conclude that its findings were clearly erroneous.  Further, 
while the “unique circumstances” cited by the District Court are not exceedingly 
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 In full, factor nine reads: 
 
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name 
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of 
subsection (c) of this section. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX). 
5
 The factors as listed in Shields were re-written as part of the Trademark Dilution 




indicative of bad faith, we find no clear error with their inclusion in the holistic approach.  
Moreover, when we accord the proper amount of deference to the District Court’s 
balancing of both statutory and non-statutory factors, we are not left with a “definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Sabinsa Corp., 609 F.3d at 182.   
II. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
  
 
 
